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Associate Professor, School of Law, Faculty of Business and Law, Deakin University 
THE MODERN AUSTRALIAN LAW OF MENTAL HARM: PAROCHIALISM 
TRIUMPHANT∗ 
In the 19th century, within the constraints of the Imperial system of precedent, each colonial 
jurisdiction was developing its own common law jurisprudence, including the law of torts. However, 
as part of the nation-building compact, one of the aims of the Founding Fathers was to ensure a 
reasonable degree of uniformity of common law amongst the States (and later, Territories) of the 
Federation.1 To this end, Pt III of the Commonwealth Constitution2 created the High Court of 
Australia as the Court of Appeal from all State Supreme Courts whether they are exercising federal or 
purely State jurisdiction.3 Its determinations on common law appeals from any jurisdiction are 
binding on all Australian courts.4 This system has enabled the High Court to mould and develop a 
relatively uniform Australian torts law. 
 Common law compensation for negligently occasioned “pure” psychiatric injury resulting from 
“non-physical impact”, which was historically known as nervous shock,5 dates back to the pre-
federation Victorian case of Coultas v Victorian Railway Commissioners (1886) 12 VLR 895. The 
award of damages in this case was successfully appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council (Victorian Railway Commissioners v Coultas (1888) 13 AC 222) which opined (at 225) that 
“damage arising from mere sudden terror unaccompanied by any actual physical injury, but 
occasioning a nervous or mental shock, cannot ... be considered a consequence which, in the ordinary 
course of things, would flow from the negligence of the gate-keeper”. The Privy Council’s opinion 
bound all Australian courts for a long time.  
 Throughout the 20th century the development of statutory law relating to psychiatric injury was 
slow. In 1944 the New South Wales Parliament created a statutory cause of action for nervous shock, 
which provided that a member of the family of a person killed, injured or put in peril by the 
negligence of the defendant may bring an action for nervous shock if the person was within the sight 
or hearing of such member of the family.6 Similar provisions were adopted in 1955 by the Northern 
Territory and the Australian Capital Territory.7 Other jurisdictions were governed by common law, 
which required that, for the duty of care to arise in pure nervous shock cases, claimants had to be 
present at the scene and perceive the injury to or death of the close relative with their own unaided 
senses (Chester v Council of Municipality of Waverley (1939) 62 CLR 1). It was only in Mount Isa 
Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383 and Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 that the High 
Court provided a uniform matrix for the law of pure nervous shock in Australia (discussed below).  
 Rules for recovery of damages for psychiatric illness enunciated in Jaensch v Coffey were 
reconsidered by the High Court of Australia in Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian 
                                                          
∗ Based on a paper titled “Nervous Shock and the Torts Reform in Australia”, presented at the 29th International Congress on 
Law and Mental Health, Paris, 2-8 July 2005. 
1 Clark IA, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law (Charles F Maxwell, Melbourne, 1901) pp 190-208. 
2 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK). The High Court itself was established by the Judiciary Act 1903 
(Cth).  
3 Australia Act 1986 (Cth) abolished all appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from the State Supreme Courts. 
4 Crawford J, Australian Courts of Law (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1986) p 160. Jurisdictional variations were 
mainly due to legislative actions; historically, the areas of the law that torts regulated by statute included defamation, 
occupiers’ liability and contributory negligence. 
5 Mendelson D, “English Medical Experts and the Claims for Shock Occasioned by Railway Collisions in the 1860s: Issues of 
Law and Ethics and Medicine” (2002) 25 (4) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 303; Mendelson D, Interfaces of 
Medicine and Law: The History of the Liability for Negligently Caused Psychiatric Injury (Nervous Shock) (Ashgate, 1998). 
6 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW), s 4 together with s 3 was repealed in part by the Civil Liability 
Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Act 2002 (NSW) and replaced by the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 3. 
7 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 (ACT), s 24(1). This provision has been repealed and a modified version is 
now contained in the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 36; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 25. 
 Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317; [2002] HCA 35 (Tame; Annetts). The decision, brought down 
in early 2002, profoundly changed the principles governing the common law of compensation for 
negligently inflicted pure psychiatric injury. However, in late 2002 and 2003, the rules in Tame; 
Annetts were legislatively modified by six jurisdictions, New South Wales, Tasmania, Western 
Australia, the Australian Capital Territory, Victoria and South Australia. The new statutory regime 
was created as part of the legislative implementation, to a greater or lesser extent, of a series of wide-
ranging reforms to the law of torts by each of the nine Australian jurisdictions (including the 
Commonwealth) during the same period.  
 New South Wales, Tasmania, Western Australia, the Australian Capital Territory, Victoria and 
South Australia changed the appellation of “nervous shock” to “mental harm”,8 which the legislation 
(apart from Victoria) defines as “impairment of the person’s mental condition”.9 In all six 
jurisdictions the “mental harm” head of damage is divided into two categories:  
• “consequential mental harm”, which follows on physical injury (as where depression is suffered 
as a result of an injury to the body); and 
• “stand alone” or “pure mental harm” (where a person suffers a recognised psychiatric illness as a 
result of either witnessing or being involved in traumatic events or experiencing the negligently 
inflicted death of or injury to a loved one). 
Under statutory reforms, only claimants who suffer a recognised (as against the common law’s sloppy 
“recognisable”) psychiatric illness or disorder can recover damages for negligently occasioned mental 
harm.10  
 The aim of the reform legislation was to modify the common law; consequently its salient 
features need to be analysed in the context of the common law as it operated before 2002 and the 
revolutionary decision of the Australian High Court in Tame; Annetts. 
Common law of pure mental harm before 2002 
Between 1984 and 2002, the Australian common law relating to psychiatric injury was governed by 
the High Court’s decision in Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549. In this case, the High Court 
allowed recovery for what is now called “pure mental harm” to Mrs Coffey who was at home when 
her husband was severely injured in a vehicle collision. 
 The court determined that Mrs Coffey could recover damages for pure mental harm because, 
though not present at the scene of the accident, she came to the hospital during the period of the 
immediate post-accident treatment of her injured husband. Following the Jaensch v Coffey decision, 
claimants could recover damages for a recognised psychiatric illness, which is a result of a shock 
occasioned by the death or injury of their loved ones (or fellow workers if the claimant is a rescuer), 
even though they were not physically present at the scene of the accident. However, the claimants 
must have experienced the “immediate aftermath” of the event “with their own unaided senses”.11 
The claimant’s sensory perception of the accident could be either visual or auditory or both.12 For 
example, once notified by the police of her husband’s accident, Mrs Coffey went to the Royal 
Adelaide Hospital’s emergency ward, where she saw him being wheeled into the operating room. 
 The Jaensch v Coffey test of causation required that the psychiatric illness be induced by a single 
“shock”.13 Moreover, the subjective test of causation14 was qualified by the prerequisite of “normal 
                                                          
8  Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 32; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 27; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 29; Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5Q; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 3. The change followed a recommendation contained in Ipp D, 
Cane P, Sheldon D and Macintosh I, Review of the Law of Negligence Report (2 October 2002) at [3.42]: see 
http://www.revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/reports.asp (Second Report, released on 2 October 2002) (Ipp Report). 
9  In Victoria, the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 67, defines “mental harm” in a less circular manner as “psychological or psychiatric 
injury”. No explanation is provided for the distinction between psychological and psychiatric injury. 
10 Hinz v Berry [1970] 2 QB 40 at 42-43 per Lord Denning MR; Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383 at 394 per 
Windeyer J. 
11 Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 at 560. See also Campbelltown City Council v Mackay (1989) 15 NSWLR 501. 
12 In Petrie v Dowling [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-263, the court awarded compensation for nervous shock to a mother who 
collapsed with grief upon being informed at the hospital that her young daughter was killed in a collision caused by the 
defendant’s negligence. 
13 See eg Campbelltown City Council v Mackay (1989) 15 NSWLR 501.  
 fortitude”, whereby the claimant is required to show that a person of “normal fortitude” would have 
suffered pure psychiatric injury as a result of the defendant’s negligent act or omission.15 The 
criterion of “normal fortitude” did not apply where the defendant had prior knowledge of the 
plaintiff’s susceptibility to psychiatric illness.16  
 With respect to the remoteness of damage, once breach and causation were established, the “take 
your victim as you find him” rule applied to extend the liability to any exacerbation of the victim’s 
pre-existing psychological vulnerability.17  
Common law exceptions to recovery 
Jaensch v Coffey broadened the scope of defendants’ liability to claimants who were not present at 
the scene of the accident. In order to contain the potential opening of the floodgates, in Jaensch v 
Coffey the High Court excluded the following:18  
• claimants who experienced normal rather than pathological grief19 as a result of their loved one’s 
death or injury;  
• claimants who developed psychiatric illness as a result of prolonged and constant association and 
care of a seriously injured relative subsequent to immediate post-accident treatment (at 565 per 
Brennan J); 
• claimants who were told about the death or injury of their loved one, rather than perceiving the 
accident or its immediate aftermath with their own unaided senses; this is known as the “mere 
knowledge” rule;20 
• claimants who suffered psychiatric injury as a result of being involved in an accident occasioned 
by the tortfeasor, where the shocking death of the tortfeasor triggered a recognised psychiatric 
disorder;21  and 
• bystanders in the sense of officious intermeddlers, curious onlookers and involuntary onlookers 
who were strangers to the victim of the accident.  
 The Jaensch v Coffey theory of recovery for pure psychiatric damage was underpinned by a 
special notion of proximity which was discarded by the High Court in the late 1990s. This meant that 
the Jaensch v Coffey theory relating to pure mental harm would have to be reconceptualised. The 
High Court did so in the bizarre case of Tame v New South Wales22 and the tragic case of Annetts v 
Australian Stations Pty Ltd.23 The two appeals were heard together.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
14 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434; [2001] HCA 18 at [24], [44], [45] per McHugh J; at [87] per Gummow J; at 
[153], [154] per Kirby J.  
15 Bunyan v Jordan (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 350; (1937) 57 CLR 1; Barnes v Commonwealth (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 511; Levi v 
Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 48; Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92; Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 
CLR 383; Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; Woodrow v Commonwealth (1993) 45 FCR 52.  
16 Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 at 565.  
17 Nader v Urban Transit Authority (NSW) (1985) 2 NSWLR 501; Havenaar v Havenaar [1982] 1 NSWLR 626; 
Commonwealth v McLean (1996) 41 NSWLR 389. 
18 Deane J held that in addition to the general test of reasonable foreseeability, the claimants must establish the existence of 
special proximity between the parties. The notion of proximity as a “conceptual determinant for the existence of duty of care” 
overarching the test of reasonable foreseeability was developed by Deane J, with whom all justices of the High Court, except 
Brennan J, eventually agreed. However, Deane J’s notion of proximity was abandoned in Sullivan v Moody; Thompson v 
Connon (2001) 207 CLR 562; [2001] HCA 59 at [42]. 
19 Swan v Williams (Demolition) Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 172; [1987] Aust Torts Reports 68,656 at 80-104. 
20 The “mere knowledge” rule in relation to tortfeasors was thus defined by Windeyer J in Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 
125 CLR 383 at 407: “If the sole cause of shock be what is told or read of some happening then, … unless there be an intention 
to cause a nervous shock, no action lies against … the person who caused the event of which they tell.” 
21  For example, in Shipard v Motor Accident Commission (1997) 70 SASR 240, Mr Shipard was driving a prime mover when 
Mr Young, riding his motorcycle, collided with the prime mover and was decapitated. Mr Shipard successfully claimed 
damages for “nervous shock” and post-traumatic stress disorder, which he suffered as a result of the collision that was due to 
Mr Young’s negligence. See also FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Lucre (2000) 32 MVR 540 in which a car driver was wholly 
responsible for a collision with a truck. The car and its driver were crushed under the truck. The truck driver, though not 
physically injured, successfully claimed damages for post-traumatic stress disorder occasioned by the crash. The court held that 
he was an immediate victim to whom the deceased owed a duty of care. 
22 Appeal from Morgan v Tame (2000) 49 NSWLR 21 (affirmed). 
23 Appeal from Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2000) 23 WAR 35 (reversed). 
  As noted above, the High Court’s decision in Tame; Annetts appeared radical in many respects. 
Their Honours commented that the special prerequisites are arbitrary and based on fear rather than 
principle.24 In the event, the court reconsidered three substantive law rules. The first was the “direct 
perception” rule (at [45] per Gaudron J), which  involved duty of care, while the “sudden shock” rule 
and the “normal fortitude” rule involved causation.  
 In Tame, a policeman, in the course of investigating a motor car collision between Mrs Tame and 
another driver, inadvertently transposed the heavily intoxicated driver’s blood-alcohol reading and 
her own, which was nil. Although the mistake was subsequently corrected, and no one had acted on 
the erroneous information, Mrs Tame claimed that she developed a psychotic depressive illness, not 
as a result of the shock of the collision but when her solicitor told her of the incorrect entry. The High 
Court determined that the police officer did not owe Mrs Tame a duty to take reasonable care to avoid 
causing her injury of the kind she had suffered.  
 In Annetts, a 16-year-old, James Annetts, from New South Wales worked as a jackaroo on the 
defendant’s cattle station in Western Australia. Prior to James undertaking the job, the defendant 
employer assured his parents in a telephone conversation that their son would be safe, working under 
constant supervision. This did not occur; instead, James was sent to work alone as a caretaker at a 
remote location. Mr Annetts collapsed on being told by the police that James was missing. James’s 
remains were found nearly five months after his death. Allowing recovery, the High Court determined 
by a majority that ordinary principles of negligence should govern cases of pure mental harm 
“unhindered by artificial constrictions based on the circumstance that the illness for which redress 
was sought was purely psychiatric” (at [236] per Gummow and Kirby JJ).25  
Elements of action for negligently occasioned pure psychiatric injury at 
common law 
In Tame; Annetts, the High Court recast the substantive aspects of this cause of action in the 
following way. 
Reasonable foreseeability 
The court held that reasonable foreseeability of risk should be the fundamental test for the imposition 
of a duty of care in pure psychiatric injury claims. Consequently, at common law there is now no 
difference between cases of physical injury and cases of psychiatric injury. In both, reasonable 
foresight of the risk of harm will prima facie determine the existence of a duty of care, though, as 
McHugh J (at [105]) noted: “[A]t least in some situations, policy issues may be relevant to the issue 
of reasonable foresight because reasonableness requires a value judgment.”  
 Moreover, the risk of the plaintiff developing a psychiatric injury must be reasonably foreseeable 
at the time the alleged wrongful conduct was supposed to occur. Thus in Koehler v Cerebos 
(Australia) Ltd (2005) 79 ALJR 845; [2005] HCA 15, the plaintiff claimed that due to the employer’s 
negligence in overloading her with work, she became stressed and suffered a severe depressive injury. 
McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, in a joint judgment (Callinan J concurring in a separate 
judgment), stated (at [36]): 
[T]he employer engaging an employee to perform stated duties is entitled to assume, in the absence of 
evident signs warning of the possibility of psychiatric injury, that the employee considers that he or she 
is able to do the job. 
 
The joint judgment (at [28]) emphasised that the plaintiff’s complaints about her work  
did not at the time bear the significance which hindsight may now attribute to them. What was said did 
not convey at that time any reason to suspect the possibility of future psychiatric injury. 
(emphasis in original) 
                                                          
24 Mendelson D, “The Defendants’ Liability for Negligently Caused Nervous Shock in Australia – Quo Vadis?” (1992) 18 Mon 
LR 16. 
25 In Annetts, the damage suffered by James’s parents was pure psychiatric injury; however, because of the telephone 
conversation, the relationship between them and the defendant employer was based on a pre-existing relationship. 
Consequently, Mr Annetts’s psychiatric injury would have been compensable under the general principle that a duty of care 
arises in situations where there exists a prior undertaking. 
 The “normal fortitude” test 
Although Mrs Tame’s failure to recover damages turned on the issue of “normal fortitude”, the 
majority held that “normal fortitude” is a relevant consideration but not an independent test or a 
precondition of liability for negligently inflicted psychiatric injury.26 Gummow and Kirby JJ said (at 
[189]) that “normal fortitude” should be factored into the court’s assessment: “at the stage of breach, 
of the reasonable foreseeability of the risk of psychiatric harm.” McHugh J (at [110]) dissented on 
this point and observed that foreseeability of risk in pure psychiatric injury cases should not “be 
anchored by reference to the most vulnerable person in the community” as this “would place an 
undue burden on social action and communication”, and “would seriously interfere with the 
individual’s freedom of action and communication”. His Honour concluded that to 
require the actor to take steps to avoid potential damage to the peculiarly vulnerable would impose an 
intolerable burden on the autonomy of individuals. Ordinary people are entitled to act on the basis that 
there will be a normal reaction to their conduct.  
According to Callinan J in Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd (2005) 79 ALJR 845; [2005] HCA 15 
(at [55]), the fact that “a psychiatrist placed in the same position as an employer might have foreseen 
a risk of psychiatric injury, does not mean that a reasonable employer should be regarded as likely to 
form the same view”. 
The “sudden shock” and “direct perception” factors 
In Tame; Annetts, Gleeson CJ (at [18]), concurring with Gummow and Kirby JJ,27 declared that the 
common law  
should not and does not, limit liability for damages for psychiatric injury to cases where the injury is 
caused by a sudden shock, or to cases where a plaintiff has directly perceived a distressing 
phenomenon or its immediate aftermath.  
His Honour went on to say (at [18]) that “sudden shock” and “direct perception” are factual 
considerations pertinent to 
the question whether it is reasonable to require one person to have in contemplation injury of the kind 
that has been suffered by another and to take reasonable care to guard against such injury. In particular, 
they may be relevant to the nature of the relationship between plaintiff and defendant, and to the 
making of a judgment as to whether the relationship is such as to import such a requirement. 
In other words, the “sudden shock” and “direct perception” control mechanisms were removed from 
the category of prerequisites or preconditions to the recovery of damages for negligently inflicted 
pure psychiatric injury, and became factors to be considered in determining the nature of the 
relationship between the parties. According to Gummow and Kirby JJ (at [225]):  
Distance in time and space from a distressing phenomenon, and means of communication or 
acquisition of knowledge concerning that phenomenon, may be relevant to assessing reasonable 
foreseeability, causation and remoteness of damage in a common law action for negligently inflicted 
psychiatric illness. But they are not themselves decisive of liability.  
Gaudron J (at [66]) observed that “in many cases, the risk of psychological or psychiatric injury will 
not be foreseeable in the absence of a sudden shock”. Gummow and Kirby JJ (at [210]) commented 
that cases of “protracted suffering” – presumably caused by a series of distressing events, as opposed 
to “sudden shock” – should be considered at the stage of causation and remoteness of damage rather 
than the duty of care. Jettisoning of “sudden shock” as a prerequisite to the determination of duty and 
breach will extend liability to many kinds of negligent conduct that may cause or contribute to a 
recognised psychiatric illness. 
Mere knowledge 
Once distance in time and space ceased to be a barrier to the imposition of a common law duty of care 
for pure psychiatric injury, the “mere knowledge” rule was discarded. Claimants can now recover 
damages from the tortfeasor (not the messenger, unless the latter acted with an intent to inflict 
                                                          
26 See also Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd (2005) 79 ALJR 845; [2005] HCA 15 at [33].  
27 Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317; [2002] HCA 35 at [189], [213], [214], 
[225] per Gummow and Kirby JJ; see also at [51], [66] per Gaudron J and at [267] per Hayne J.  
 nervous shock),28 upon being told of a tragic event that befell a person with whom they are or were in 
a close relationship. 
The nature of the relationship 
The new interpretation of foreseeability and direct perception elements in Tame; Annetts was applied 
and elaborated on in Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; [2003] HCA 
33. In this case, the High Court determined that the lack of direct perception by the children of the 
death of their father was “not fatal” to their action in negligence for nervous shock (at [65] per 
Gummow and Kirby JJ). Gleeson CJ (at [10]) stated that at common law:  
If it is reasonable to require any person to have in contemplation the risk of psychiatric injury to 
another, then it is reasonable to require an employer to have in contemplation the children of an 
employee. 
McHugh J observed that the determining factor in reasonable foreseeability of psychiatric injury, and 
hence the duty of care, should be “the closeness and affection of the relationship – rather than the 
legal status of the relationship” (at [48]).  
 Neither in Tame; Annetts nor in subsequent cases did the High Court discuss the applicable 
causation test, which, given that the shock is no longer a prerequisite of liability for pure psychiatric 
injury at common law, will need to be reformulated.  
Codification of the law of psychiatric injury in Australia 
The High Court’s extension of liability in Tame; Annetts was greeted with some alarm. Six 
jurisdictions followed the recommendations contained in the Ipp Panel’s Review of the Law of 
Negligence Report,29 which aimed to overcome parts of the decision. The new statutory principles, 
often expressed in different words, are applicable to any claim for damages for mental harm resulting 
from negligence regardless of whether the claim is brought in tort, contract, equity, under a statute or 
any other cause of action.30  
 New South Wales, Tasmania, Western Australia and Victoria exclude various statutes and 
provisions in each jurisdiction from statutory civil liability for mental harm.31 For example, the four 
jurisdictions bar cases where the injury or death has “resulted from smoking or other use of tobacco 
products”.32 Compensation claims for these kinds of injuries are to be pursued under pre-reform 
common law or under other (specific) legislation. In Victoria, under an opaquely worded s 69(2) of 
the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic):  
A claim for damages referred to in sub-section (1)(e) [dust-related condition] or (1)(f) [smoking or 
other use of tobacco products] does not include a claim for damages that relates to the provision of or 
the failure to provide a health service. 
Presumably this means that while the claims for dust-related and tobacco-related injuries will remain 
within the purview of the pre-reform common law, compensation claims for negligent medical 
treatment of such injuries will have to be pursued under the relevant statutory provisions of the 
amended Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic). 
 In all jurisdictions apart from the Australian Capital Territory, claimants have to meet statutory 
thresholds before they can recover damages for non-economic loss.33  
                                                          
28 Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383 at 407.  
29 See Ipp Report, n 8.  
30 Ipp Report, n 8 at [2.1]-[2.3].   
31 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 3B(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 3B(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 3A(1); 
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 69(1). For a more detailed discussion of Victorian provisions see Luntz H, “Recovery of Damages 
for Negligently Inflicted Psychiatric Injury: Where Are We Now?”, paper delivered to the Forensic Psychiatry Association,  
16 August 2004. 
32 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 3B(1)(c); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 3B(1)(b); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA),  
s 3A(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 69(1)(f).  
33 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss 87P-87S; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 16; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 52; Civil 
Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 61 and 62; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss 28LB, 28LE and 28LF; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and 
Damages) Act 2003 (NT), Div 4, ss 22-28; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 27; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), ss 9, 10.  
 Elements of liability 
The six reforming jurisdictions accepted the Tame; Annetts doctrine that reasonable foreseeability 
should be the touchstone for the existence of a duty of care in psychiatric injury cases. They were 
rather less certain that the test should dispense with the “normal fortitude” requirement. 
Consequently, New South Wales,34 Tasmania,35 Western Australia36 and the Australian Capital 
Territory37 enacted provisions that are very similar to s 33(1) of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA): 
A person (the “defendant”) does not owe a duty to another person (the “plaintiff”) to take care not to 
cause the plaintiff mental harm unless a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have 
foreseen that a person of normal fortitude in the plaintiff’s position might, in the circumstances of the 
case, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken.38  
The reference to “mental harm” means that in five jurisdictions, the statutory test for the existence of 
a duty of care applies to both consequential and pure mental harm. Victoria’s definition39 is virtually 
identical except that it only applies to “pure mental harm”, thus excluding consequential mental harm. 
The Victorian legislation is a more accurate reflection of the common law, which historically has 
treated consequential mental harm in the same way as any physical injury and its medical 
complications.  
 In all six jurisdictions, the legislation provides that a duty of care is imposed in the circumstances 
of the case where the defendant ought to have foreseen “that a person of normal fortitude might … 
suffer a recognised psychiatric illness”. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines “might” as 
“expressing a possibility based on an unfulfilled condition”.40 The term can be interpreted as referring 
to a mere chance or contingency. Whether by design or inadvertence, a statutory test for the 
imposition of a duty to take reasonable care based on a possibility or chance of mental harm is much 
more onerous on the defendant than the statutory test for the duty of care in general negligence, which 
grounds the duty on foreseeability of “not insignificant” risk.41 Depending on how far the judges are 
willing to extend the scope of liability for mental harm, it is always possible to speculate that the 
defendant ought to have foreseen a chance that a person of normal fortitude might suffer such an 
injury. However, speculation as the basis for the imposition of liability does not necessarily make a 
good law. 
New category of case 
The statutory definition of requirements for the existence of a duty in cases of mental harm (“pure 
mental harm” in Victoria) has effectively created a distinct category of case, which prescribes tests 
that are additional to the general statutory and common law principles governing breach of duty and 
causation. 
 The conjunction “unless” in the primary provision makes the imposition of a duty of care for 
mental harm (pure mental harm in Victoria) exceptional, in the sense that it is contingent upon the 
plaintiff being able to establish three elements on the balance of probabilities: 
                                                          
34 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 32(1). 
35 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 34(1). 
36 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5S (1). 
37 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 34(1). 
38 The statutory duty of care is subject to an exception, which codifies the common law principle that knowledge of the 
plaintiff’s vulnerability imposes upon the defendant a duty to take greater care. See Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 34(4); Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 32(4); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5S(4) reads: “This section does not require the court to 
disregard what the defendant knew or ought to have known about the fortitude of the plaintiff.” The Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 
2002 (ACT), s 34(4) and the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 72(3), state: “This section does not affect the duty of care of a person 
(the defendant) to another (the plaintiff) if the defendant knows, or ought to know, that the plaintiff is a person of less than 
normal fortitude.” 
39 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 72(1). 
40 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Soanes C and Stevenson A, eds) (Oxford University Press, 2004); Oxford 
Reference Online, Oxford University Press: see http://www.oxfordreference.com/views 
/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t23.e35332 viewed 1 May 2005. 
41 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 43(3); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48(3); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5B(1)(b); 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 11(3); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B(3).  
 • duty of care: reasonable foreseeability of a recognised psychiatric illness that might be suffered 
by a person of “normal fortitude” based on the objective test of “a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s position” in the “circumstances of the case”;  
• breach (or content) of duty: failure by the defendant to take “reasonable care” to avoid such 
harm; the breach is to be determined in accordance with statutory principles of the “calculus of 
negligence”;42 and 
• causation: the court has to be persuaded that “a person of normal fortitude” in the plaintiff’s 
position might, in the circumstances of the case, have suffered a recognised psychiatric illness.  
The adjectival phrase “normal fortitude” is not defined in the legislation, and will be governed by the 
common law understanding of this notion.  
The “circumstances of the case” 
The reference to the “circumstances of the case” in the definition of the duty of care indicates that the 
“circumstances” (as specified in the legislation) form an element of the cause of action, at least in 
relation to pure mental harm. In five jurisdictions,43 the “circumstances of the case” in relation to pure 
mental harm are defined as including: 
• whether or not the mental harm was suffered as the result of a sudden shock; 
• whether the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, a person being killed, injured or put in danger; 
• the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and any person killed, injured or put in danger; 
and 
• whether or not there was a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
The first two factors or considerations were drafted in response to the Tame; Annetts’s refusal to limit 
the liability for damages for pure mental harm “to cases where the injury is caused by a sudden shock, 
or to cases where the plaintiff has directly perceived a distressing phenomenon or its immediate 
aftermath”.44  
 The second factor, while imposing the requirement of the claimant witnessing “at the scene, a 
person being killed, injured or put in danger”, actually broadens the scope of liability, for it appears to 
include bystanders (strangers).  
 The third consideration, involving “the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and any 
person killed, injured or put in danger”, is open to interpretation. Apart from family members, it 
might also include close (“affectionate”) friendships, collegiate relationships and co-workers as well 
as rescuers. 
 The fourth factor, relating to the presence of “a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and 
the defendant”, reflects the common law which, as a general rule, tends to impose the duty of care on 
parties in pre-existing relationships.  
 The four factors are not cumulative, and presumably, the plaintiff will need to satisfy only one or 
two of them in order to fulfil the requirement of the “circumstances of the case”.  
 Victoria, New South Wales and Tasmania45 impose two further threshold requirements in 
relation to pure mental harm. The legislation prohibits recovery for pure mental harm “arising wholly 
or partly from mental or nervous shock in connection with another person (the victim) being killed, 
injured or put in peril by the act or omission of the defendant”46 unless the plaintiff “witnessed, at the 
                                                          
42 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 43(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5B(2); Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 11(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B(2). 
43 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 32(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 34(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5S (2); Civil 
Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 34(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 72(2). 
44 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; [2002] HCA 35 at [18] per Gleeson CJ. 
45 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 73(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 30; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 32.  
46 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 30(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 32(1). Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 73(1) has identical 
wording, except that ‘danger’ is substituted for ‘peril’. 
 scene, the victim being killed, injured or put in danger”;47 or “the plaintiff is [‘is or was’] in Victoria] 
a close member of the family of the victim”.48 
 In South Australia, under the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 53(1): 
Damages may only be awarded for mental harm if the injured person –  
(a) was physically injured in the accident or was present at the scene of the accident when the 
accident occurred; or  
(b) is a parent, spouse or child of a person killed, injured or endangered in the accident.  
In these four jurisdictions (as well as in Western Australia),49 the legislation effectively entrenches 
the right of bystanders present at the scene to recover for “mental or nervous shock”, if they can 
establish the statutory requirements for the existence of the defendant’s duty of care. With the 
exception of Western Australia (where recovery will be subject to “the nature of the relationship 
between the plaintiff and any person killed, injured or put in peril”),50 the legislation also confirms 
that close family members do not need to be present at the scene of the accident in order to recover 
damages for pure mental harm. 
                                                          
 Section 36(1) of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) is narrower in its scope: 
[L]iability in relation to an injury caused by a wrongful act or omission by which someone else (“A”) 
is killed, injured or put in danger includes liability for injury arising completely or partly from mental 
or nervous shock received by – 
(a) a parent of A; or 
(b) a domestic partner of A; or  
(c) another family member of A, if A was killed, injured or put in danger within the sight or 
hearing of the other family member. 
 The Northern Territory has retained its existing statutory cause of action for nervous shock, 
which allows recovery where close relatives of the person killed, injured or put in peril sustain injury 
arising wholly or in part from mental or nervous shock.51  
 None of the statutes defines the term “mental or nervous shock”. This suggests that the 
legislatures wished to retain its historic, common law meaning as defined in Mount Isa Mines v Pusey 
and Jaensch v Coffey, with its emphasis on sudden experience that traumatises the mind or emotions.  
 Queensland is the only State jurisdiction entirely governed by common law. 
 Thus, after 100 years of Federation, Australia has acquired a patchwork of statutory and common 
law rules that govern recovery for mental harm. Each regime is different and may not be easily 
amenable to a harmonising process. One could call it parochialism triumphant. 
Danuta Mendelson 
 
47 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 73(2)(a); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 30(2)(a); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 32(2)(a). The 
Tasmanian provision preserves the Jaensch v Coffey notion of an “immediate aftermath” by adding: “or put in peril or the 
immediate aftermath of the victim being killed or injured”. 
48 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 32(2)(b); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 30(2)(b); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 73(2)(b). 
49 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5S(2)(b) provides: “in respect of pure mental harm, the circumstances of the case include the 
following … (b) whether the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, a person being killed, injured or put in peril.” 
50 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5S(2)(c). 
51 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 25. 
